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COMMENTS
CARDIAC CASES UNDER THE WISCONSIN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
The tendency of modern day courts to become more liberal in their
application of workmen's compensation provisions has reached alarming
proportions. Perhaps this is more true in the area of cardiac cases than
in any other segment of workmen's compensation law. How this pro-
pensity developed in Wisconsin and the problems it has produced are
the subject of this article.
Workmen's compensation is a general and comprehensive term ap-
plied to and embracing those laws providing for compensation due to
loss resulting from injury, disablement, or death of workmen through
industrial accident, casualty, or disease, which possess the common fea-
ture or characteristic of providing such compensation otherwise than
on the basis of tort liability. In effect, workmen's compensation not only
provides benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected injuries,
but also places the cost of these injuries ultimately upon the consumer
by manipulating the pricing mechanism. Generally speaking, a typical
workmen's compensation act has the following features: (a) the em-
ployee is immediately entitled to certain benefits upon suffering a
"personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment"; (b) negligence and fault are largely immaterial, in that
negligence of the employee does not decrease his rights and the em-
ployer's freedom from fault does not lessen his liability; (c) recovery
is limited to those individuals having the status of employee; (d) bene-
fits to the employee include cash wage benefits and hospital and medi-
cal expenses; (e) the employee and his dependents give up their com-
mon law right to sue the employer for damages for any injury covered
by the act; (f) there remains the right to sue third parties whose negli-
gence caused the injury; (g) jurisdiction is typically in the hands of
an administrative tribunal; and (h) the employer is required to insure
his liability either through private insurance, a state fund, or self-
insurance.'
Workmen's compensation has arisen out of the conditions produced
by modern industrial development and the inability of common law tort
liability to satisfy such needs. The causes of injuries in industry today
are frequently obscure and complex and therefore often make it im-
possible to correctly ascertain the facts necessary to make an accurate
judgment; this fact plus the expense and delay necessitated for such
determination results, in effect, in the defeat of justice. Under such
circumstances there is little doubt that the common law rule of tort
liability for personal injuries arising out of the operation of industrial
enterprises, coupled with the defenses of (a) assumption of risk, (b)
I I LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1952).
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contributory negligence, and (c) negligence of fellow servant, are out-
moded and inadequate to cope with present day employment conditions.'
The courts at common law determined the extent of the employer's
responsibility for an industrial accident upon the basis of industrial
conditions, a social philosophy, and an archaic attitude toward labon
The common law belief was built upon the economic theory that there
was complete mobility of labor, that the workman was an agent who
was entirely free and under no compulsion to enter into employment.
The employee was expected to carry all the usual risks of his trade, plus
any unusual risks of which he had knowledge.
Under the modern compensation acts the common law theory is
abandoned and a right to recovery for all injuries incident to employ-
ment is given, with certain exceptions. The general purposes of modern
workmen's compensation acts are:
(1) to improve the economic status of the worker;
(2) to remove the uncertainties attendant upon common law
remedies;
(3) to transfer from the employee to the employer and subse-
quently to the consumer the burden of the expense of the
economic loss due to the accident; and
(4) to improve employee-employer relations. 3
The improvement of the economic status of the employee is of primary
importance, as has been readily pointed out by Commissioner R. G.
Knutson of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission.4
Germany, in 1884, was the'first country to approve a modern com-
pensation plan.5 They adopted their system thirteen years before Eng-
land, twenty-five years before the first American jurisdiction, and sixty-
five years before the last American state. Although the American com-
pensation system was modeled after that of Germany and later England,
ours differs from the German plan in that the American employer con-
tributes the entire amount to the fund whereas the employer and em-
ployee both contributed under Germany's system.
By the end of the nineteenth century, because of the coincidence of
increasing industrial injuries and decreasing remedies, America was
ready for a change in its compensation system, but it was not until
1911 that any workmen's compensation acts were passed which with-
2 These three defenses were the employer's at common law and they were
religiously exercised by him to avoid any and all liability due to injuries of
the employee while on the job.
3 58 AM. JuR. Workmen's Compensation § 2, at 575-76 (1948).
4 At a symposium presented by the University of Wisconsin on May 9-10, 1961,
commemorating the passage of the Wisconsin workmen's compensation law
fifty years earlier, Commissioner R. G. Knutson, in presenting "An Ad-
ministrator's Views on Workmen's Compensation in Action," said: "It should
never be forgotten that workmen's compensation laws were passed primarily
to benefit the injured worker and his dependents.
5 1 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5.10.
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stood the constitutional test. The first compensation laws were de-
clared invalid on the ground that it was a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law to require an employer to make compensation
to employees for injuries arising in the course of employment unless
the injuries were attributed to some negligence imputable to the em-
ployer. 6 On May 3, 1911, Wisconsin became the first state to approve
and put into effect a workmen's compensation law, and during that
same year nine other states followed the precedent established by Wis-
consin.7 This legislation marked a new era in the law governing work
injuries and spelled death for an antiquated approach to the problem
of the injured workman, for constitutional squabbles, and for judicial
obstacles to progress.8
ROLE OF HEART CASES IN WORKMtEN'S COMPENSATION
In recent years heart cases have become a significant factor in work-
men's compensation litigation. Statistics demonstrate that heart cases
are presently an important segment of workmen's compensation and
in all probability will continue to increase. More than seventy-five
percent of persons above the age of fifty-five suffer from arteriosclerosis
and the number of coronary occlusions now exceeds the million mark
each yearf Thus, members of the work force in this age group are
prime targets for heart disease, whether they be blue or white collar
personnel. More shocking yet is the fact that one of every two workmen
reaches the end of his life or his working days as a consequence of
heart disease.'0
In heart cases, as in any compensation claim, there are two basic
requirements which must be satisfied before recovery is permitted. First,
the injury or harm must be "incurred in the course of the employ-
ment." Secondly, and more important,, the injury or harm must "arise
out of the employment." The first requirement relates to the employee
at the time of the accident and involves the determination of whether
he is within the scope of his employment. The second requirement, the
one which poses the most difficulty in heart cases, refers to the causal
relationship between the employment and the injury. Basically the Wis-
consin court agrees with other jurisdictions that before recovery will
be permitted these two requisites must be present.:"
6 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), which struck
down the first New York act on March 24, 1911.
7 WIScONSIN INDUS. CoMm'N, REP'T. No. 31, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1962).
The other nine states to pass compensation acts in 1911 were California, Illi-
nois, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, Ohio,
and Washington.8 Riesenfield, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 7 NACCA
L. J. 15 (1951). The constitutionality of the Wisconsin workmen's compensa-
tion act was upheld in Borgnis v. Falk Co., 14Z Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
9 Katz, A Statement on Arteriosclerosis, 19 MONOGRAPH (1959).
10 McNEcE, HEART DISEASE AND THE LAW 112 (1961).
11 In Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 62 N.W. 2d
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Before applying the requisite conditions of liability for heart cases,
it is necessary to determine if a cardiac case in general is compensable
under the Wisconsin workmen's compensation act, and the key to this
inquiry is whether a heart case is encompassed within the meaning of
the term "accident."1 2 As previously noted, American jurisdictions
adopted their compensation systems from the original British act and
in so doing they borrowed the terminology "injury by accident" from
that act.13 In the English interpretation of the phrase "injury by acci-
dent," the word accident was to be used in its popular or ordinary sense
rather than some arbitrary, legal, technical, or contractual meaning.14
In 1915, the Wisconsin court accepted their present meaning of the
term "accidental" to correspond with that adopted earlier by the British
act.' 5
In most jurisdictions the greatest source of controversy centers
around the problem of "accidental cause versus accidental result." The
word "accidental" refers to an event which is unusual, not expected,
and undesigned. It reflects an occurrence which is not within the fore-
sight and expectation of an individual, resulting in a mishap proving
to be injurious to the employee. Suppose an employee has for several
years done nothing but lift one-hundred pound sacks, and one day while
performing such operation he suffers a heart attack. Assuming that
medical testimony confirms the fact that such heavy lifting did in fact
cause the heart attack, was the unlooked for item or untoward event
the cause or the effect? If it was the cause, that is, the external condi-
tions immediately prior to the injury, no unexpected event can be
shown. But if it is the result upon the individual that is unlooked for,
567 (1954), the court said: "The two essential tests which must be satisfied
to show liability on part of the employer under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, are that the employee at the time of the accident was performing service
growing out of and incidental to his employment, and that the injury arose
out of employment. These are independent tests and must be satisfied by
separate showing of proof." See also Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 268 Wis. 613, 68 N.W. 2d 44 (1955).
12 Wis. STAT. ch. 102 (1961); see §§ 102.03 and 102.01 for "injury due to
accident" and definition of the term "injury."
13 See 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 38.10. Note from Wis. STAT. ch. 102
(1961) that Wisconsin's wording of the term "accident" in its act is slightly
different and a modification of the original British terminology.
14The original English case from which the popular meaning of the word
"accident" was adopted was Fenton v. Thorley, 89 L.T. R. (n.s.) 314 (H.L.
1903). See Bystrom Bros. v. Jacobson, 162 Wis. 180, 182, 155 N.W. 919, 920
(1916), and 1 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 37.20, 38.10. In the Fenton case
the court said: "If a man, in lifting a weight, or trying to move something
not easily moved, were to strain a muscle, or rick his back, or rupture him-
self, the mishap in ordinary parlance, would be described as accidental." 89
L.T.R. (n.s.) at 315.
15 See Venner v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 374, 154 N.W. 640, 642
(1915), in which the court said: "The term 'accidental', as used in compensa-
tion laws, denotes something unusual, unexpected, and undesigned. The na-
ture of it implies that there was an external act or occurrence which caused
the personal injury .... It contemplates an event not within one's foresight
and expectation, resulting in a mishap causing injury to the employee."
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that is, the effect upon the employee which followed from the fact that
he lifted the sack, then surely the injury can be considered as acci-
dental.
16
It is evident that in Wisconsin the unlooked for or unforeseen event
can be the result as well as the cause. The Wisconsin court points this
out in Bystrom Bros. v. Jacobsonw. 7 Larson notes this as well when he
says:
The 'by accident' requirement is now deemed satisfied in most
jurisdictions either if the cause was of an accidental character
or if the effect was the unexpected result of routine performance
of the claimant's duties. Accordingly, if the strain of the claim-
ant's usual exertions causes collapse from heart weakness, back
weakness, hernia and the like, the injury is held accidental.' 8
Once heart cases were found to be compensable, the issue of causa-
tion came to the forefront. To satisfy the statutory requirement that the
injury must "arise out of the employment," the claimant must prove
that the job activity caused the heart attack. Even though the injury-
in our case the heart attack-was accidental, the causal relationship
must still be shown; that is, the work, though usual and routine, must
have caused or contributed to the bringing about of the heart attack.
Though the problem of causality is most troublesome in any work-
men's compensation case, it is notably magnified in the area of cardiac
cases due to the fact that most if not all forms of heart disease are
progressive in nature and their characteristic symptoms frequently ap-
pear without warning after a long history of fine health. Throughout
the medical profession there is widespread dispute as to the causality
of heart disease and this further obscures an already hazy and con-
troversial field.
Probably the most controversial cardiac cases involve those in which
there is a gradual worsening of a degenerative condition. In some in-
stances such a condition might reach a point where a mere slight effort
would suffice to bring about death or disability. Consequently, manage-
ment habitually contends that it should not be forced to bear the finan-
cial burden of such cases, because the worker might just as easily have
had the attack while away from his employment.' 9 The courts' tra-
16 See I LARSON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 37.20.
17162 Wis. 180, 155 N.W. 919 (1916). In that case the employee attempted to
lift a cement block weighing approximately eighty pounds while in a sitting
position, and in so doing strained the muscles in his right side. The court
said: "The thing which occurred was somewhat unusual. It was unexpected
and undesigned. There was an external occurrence. . . . The undue strain
was not forseen or expected .... There was, plainly, the physical causation
spoken of in Milwaukee v. Industrial Comer'n, 160 Wis. 238, 246, 151 N.W.
247-the effort to handle the block while the workman was so circumstanced
as to cause a perilous strain on the muscles of his right side."
181 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 1, § 38.00. See also §§ 38.20 and 38.30 and the
footnotes therein referring to cases in Wisconsin and other jurisdictions
which follow these doctrines.
'p29 NACCA L. J. 228 (1962-1963).
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ditional reply to management's contention is the familiar tort argument
that an employer takes an employee as he finds him. This view has long
been adhered to by the Wisconsin court, which recently reiterated such
position in the following statement:
An employer takes an employee 'as is' and the fact that he may
be susceptible to injury by reason of a pre-existing physical con-
dition does not relieve the last employer from being liable for the
workmen's compensation benefits if the employee becomes in-
jured due to his employment, even though the injury may not
have been such as to have caused disability in a normal indi-
vidual.2
0
Courts have awarded compensation in numerous cases where the em-
ployment has "accelerated" the disease. These cases include various
types of heart failure due to exertion, excitement, or other employment
conditions promoting the failure of a heart which was already weak-
ened but, absent the particular conditions of employment, might well
have continued to function satisfactorily for an undetermined length of
time.2 1 However, so long as the effort from an employee's work ac-
celerated an attack, the argument that the same injury might have oc-
curred while the employee was at rest is no defense.
Due to the peculiar nature of heart disease, there is more than a
mere possibility that in many instances industry is in fact footing the
bill for injuries which are not really work-connected. This latter point
poses a very real problem and encourages many employers to maintain
that the workmen's compensation system is not capable of coping with
cardiac cases. The fate of cardiac cases under workmen's compensation
will largely depend upon the ability of the courts to formulate a clear-
cut rational approach so that such cases may be adequately litigated.
In determining the compensability of cardiac cases, courts generally
will apply either the "usual" or the "unusual" strain doctrines. The
"usual" strain rule permits recovery even though the cardiac attack has
arisen by the performance of an employee's normal or ordinary duties
and functions. Jurisdictions adhering to this view believe that the
workmen's compensation provisions should be libeerally construed.
Before recovery is permitted under the "unusual" strain doctrine, a
claimant must prove that he was subjected to some irregular strain or
exertion in addition to that of his normal duties and thereby rebut the
inference that the heart ailment was due to natural causes. 22 The theory
underlying the latter belief is that the compensation acts were not
20 M. & M. Realty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 267 Wis. 52, 63, 64 N.W. 2d 413,
418 (1954). This position was reiterated in Green Bay Warehouse Operators,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Wis. 2d 11, 119 N.W. 2d 435 (1963).21 See 1 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 1, § 12.20.
22 See id., §§ 38.00 at 516, 38.60-64 at 543-56; McNIEcE, op. cit. supra note 10, at
5, 6; Comment, Heart Attack as Compensable Injury, 11 CLEv.-MAR. L. RFV.
200-02 (1962).
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intended for the indemnification of all injuries causally related to em-
ployment, but only for those injuries which were accidental in cause.
One of the problems in applying the "unusual" strain test is that
it is commonly superimposed upon the causality requirement. In reality,
if the heart attack is causally related to the employment the "unusual"
strain test should then be utilized, but it should not be adopted as a
crutch or excuse when the court is not satisfied with the proof of the
causal relationship in a particular fact situation.
23
The few courts that remain attached to the "unusual" strain rule
have construed it strictly. One such jurisdiction has said that to follow
the "usual" strain rule is equivalent to the conversion of the workmen's
compensation acts into health insurance. 24 The American Heart Associ-
ation formed a committee to study the relationship of strain to heart
disease, and in 1962 this committee made the following recommenda-
tion:
In view of the multitude of factors influencing the constantly
changing physical status of a cardiac patient, especially one suf-
fering from coronary disease, it is recommended that an unusual
strain for the given individual be the only acceptable injury rec-
ognized as aggravating, or revealing, underlying cardiac disease.2 r
The fact that such a prominent and influential organization in the
medical field has cast its support with the "unusual" strain rule may
well signify the beginning of a retreat by the courts from the "usual"
strain doctrine.
Another causation problem in cardiac cases is the confusion result-
ing from the discrepancy between the medical and the legal meaning
of the term causality. The doctor is trained in the scientific approach
to reach the etiology of an injury, whereas the lawyer's function is not
that of identifying influences toward harm which may be found in
pathology, but rather that of identifying influences toward legal re-
sponsibility for harm which may be found in the habits and behaviors
of the society surrounding man.26 The attorney need not search among
the microbes to find the peg which is most deserving to shoulder the
burden of the liability.
CARDIAC CASES IN WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin court declared in 1916 that a strain or exertion in
one's employment producing physical injury to the employee would be
compensable. In setting down this principle which is still followed today,
23 See Woods, The Heart Attack Case in Workmen's Compensation, 16 ARK. L.
REv. 214 (1962).
24 See Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
25 See 26 COMMUNITY SERVICE AND EDUCATION COUNCIL (1962).
26 For an excellent discussion of the complexities in causality between the medi-
cal and legal professions, see Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-
Legal Conflicts in the Concept of Causation, 31 TEXAS L. R v. 630 (1953).
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the court stated that "a physical strain which produces an injurious
physical result constitutes an accident in the sense that that term is used
in the act."27 This precept has been consistently applied by the court
in cardiac cases despite the presence of a pre-existing heart condition
or some related deficiency.
Claims involving cardiac cases can be distinguished on the basis
of the relative importance which the court or administrative tribunal
attaches to (1) the pre-existing condition of the claimant; (2) the type
and degree of strain involved (whether it was physical, emotional, or
a combination of the two, and whether the court applied the "usual"
or "unusual" strain tests) ; and (3) the expert medical testimony. These
three items will be of prime consideration in analyzing the Wisconsin
cases in the field of heart law.
A. CARDIACS WITHOUT PRE-EXISTING HEART DEFECT
Where there is not a pre-existing heart condition, Wisconsin cases
have been decided upon the degree of physical strain involved and, to
some extent, the expert medical testimony of physicians. In George C.
Whalen, 28 a case before the Industrial Commission in 1947, compensa-
tion was awarded to a game warden who pursued two violators on foot
for two hundred yards before apprehending them. An argument with
the violators followed during which the warden was threatened. All
of these factors contributed to the emotional excitement of the warden,
who shortly thereafter suffered a heart attack. Medical experts ad-
mitted the possibility of an attack of the warden's type caused by such
exertion and excitement, but the Commission held that in view of the
exertion and extreme excitement, which were immediately followed
by symptoms and disabilities diagnosed as an infarct, it was reasonably
probable that the injury was derived from such activity. The court placed
little significance upon the medical testimony but rather was more im-
pressed by the facts. Unfortunately, it has often become the habit in
cardiac cases for the courts and commissions to grant recovery on the
basis of an appealing fact situation while expert testimony of the medi-
cal profession falls upon deaf ears. In deciding the case the Commission
failed to mention either the "usual" or "unusual" strain doctrines, but
it is quite evident that an opposite result would have been reached had
the warden walked rather than run the two hundred yards.
In a later case, Paul Schultz, 29 the court similarly allowed recovery
27 Bystrom Bros. v. Jacobson, supra note 14. This principle was cited again in
Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 268 Wis. 513, 68 N.W.
2d 44 (1954) and Wisconsin Appleton Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 269 Wis.
312, 69 N.W. 2d 433 (1955).
28 Wisconsin Indus. Comm'n, Feb. 7, 1947. If there had been a notable delay be-
tween the exertion and the attack, quite possibly recovery would have been
denied.
Wisconsin Indus. Comm'n, Feb. 29, 1952.
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to an assistant engineer who, after assembling a step ladder, received
a sharp blow from the ladder as it fell to the ground and thereby suf-
fered burning pains in his chest and arms. His condition was diagnosed
as myocardial infarction caused by a partial coronary occlusion. Previ-
ous to this accident the claimant had been examined and found to be in
excellent health without any signs of a heart ailment. The normal work
activities of the claimant did not usually include such duties as assem-
bling ladders and was of a considerably less rigorous nature. It was
the determination of the Commission that such physical exertion in
procuring and assembling the ladder did constitute unusual stress and
strain for the claimant, which provoked the heart condition. Here the
Commission applied the "unusual" strain doctrine and failed to con-
sider that in reality the injury may have stemmed from the blow on
the chest by the falling ladder, in which case the determination of the
degree of strain would be of no importance.
In State v. Industrial Comm'n,30 the court abandoned the "unusual"
strain doctrine in allowing recovery to a game warden. The claimant had
worked strenuously for several minutes attempting to remove a beaver
dam embedded in the ice of a stream, became ill, and minutes later died
from a heart attack. Previous to this time the warden was in good health
and had been accustomed to similar work in his routine duties. Medical
testimony was of the opinion that the decedent had a damaged heart
prior to such attack, but went on to say that if the decedent had not
been engaged in such strenuous work there was little reason to believe
that he would have died at this time. Though the court failed to men-
tion the "unusual" strain doctrine, it is evident that such doctrine would
not apply in this case because the decedent was engaged in an activity
which for him was not unusual. Realistically, the facts of the case
would more properly lend themselves to the application of the "usual"
strain test in light of the fact that recovery was awarded to the de-
cedent. Certainly the medical testimony in some degree supported the
court's finding, but no doubt the court was equally persuaded by the
fact that the attack and resulting death followed immediately after
performing the strenuous activity.
In 1958, the Commission in Dorothy E. Sheahan3 ' once again awarded
recovery to an individual suffering a fatal heart attack while performing
his routine duties. This time a fireman collapsed minutes after entering
a burning building, following his response to a fire call. Medical testi-
mony was to the effect that death succeeded 'a coronary insufficiency as
a result of the physical stress and smoke inhalation. The suddenness of
the attack while performing duties as a fireman, coupled with the fa-
vorable medical testimony, were the factors which sufficiently impressed
30 272 Wis. 409, 76 N.W. 2d 362 (1956).
31 Wisconsin Indus. Comm'n, Oct. 20, 1958.
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the Commission to allow compensation. In this instance the decedent
had been employed in his capacity as a fireman for nearly twenty-five
years, so there is an implication of public policy behind the Commis-
sion's finding.
In Herbert C. Petersen, 2 the Commission in 1961 was faced with
a case involving both emotional and physical strain. A school teacher
was confronted with a fire in the school yard which she unsuccessfully
fought, subsequently calling the fire department. The teacher was an
extremely emotional and excitable person, and under the circumstances
became gravely frightened and upset. As a result of such she became
ill with a myocardial infarction which ultimately caused her death.
Once again, medical testimony sustained a finding of the examiner that
the infarction was caused by the decedent's emotional excitement and
physical activity. After this decision it is questionable as to how the
Commission will decide a cardiac case involving only emotional strain.
In the Petersen case, the Commission was not faced with this precise
issue. Most jurisdictions in the absence of physical exertion will not
permit recovery for emotional strain by itself, for fear of opening the
flood gates to such litigation in the cardiac area. However, a handful
of jusdictions have permitted recovery for purely emotional strain in
cardiac cases and, as yet, few of the often feared perplexities have
arisen.
33
Any semblance of a pattern or trend which had been established by
the Commission and the courts in cardiac cases where there was no
pre-existing heart condition was shattered by the later 1961 case of
Clara M. Schmoll 4.3 The decedent was a forest ranger and was checking
a smoke report. In so doing he traveled by car for a distance and then
walked less than one-quarter of a mile into a heavily wooded area,
where he collapsed and died. The death followed the attack almost
immediately and there was no indication of any pre-existing heart con-
dition. Medical testimony was to the effect that decedent's death re-
sulted from a coronary occlusion. The Commission dismissed the case
on the basis that decedent did not sustain an injury arising out of the
employment. It is troublesome indeed to see how the forest ranger in
this case differs from the game wardens in the Whalen and Industrial
Comm'n cases, or the fireman in the Sheahan case, each of whom was
awarded compensation. Surely, it was just as much a routine duty of
a forest ranger to enter a heavily wooded area to check out a fire report
as it was for a fireman to enter a burning building in response to a fire
32 Wisconsin Indus. Comm'n, March 17, 1961.
33 In particular, such liberal minded jurisdictions as New York, Mississippi, and
Michigan have permitted compensation in situations where mental shock was
received in course of one's work due to emergencies, arguments, or repri-
mands. For cases in these and other jurisdictions, see McNIECE, op. Cit.
supra note 10, at 30-33, and footnotes therein.
34 Wisconsin Indus. Comm'n, March 3, 1961.
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alarm. The Commission made a complete about face without any feasible
explanation. It would seem that if the Commission has decided that
an "unusual" strain doctrine is now to be applied and an employee
must perform strenuous duties outside his normal scope before recov-
ery will be granted, it should expressly state this and not hide behind
such reasoning as was advanced in this instance.
Further evidence that the Commission is moving toward the "un-
usual" strain rule in cases where there is no pre-existing injury to the
heart was borne out by Anna Wendt.35 In that case the decedent was
employed as a laborer, and on the date in question was performing work
other than his normal activity. He was required to operate at a more
rapid and constant pace, which required more than the usual amount of
exertion for him. During such activity the decedent was bothered by
pain and other discomforts in his chest. He became unable to continue
with his employment duties, was hospitalized, and died shortly there-
after from a coronary occlusion. The Commission awarded recovery,
stating that the injury was sustained while performing services in the
course of his employment and that such injury arose out of the em-
ployment.
Summary
It appears that Wisconsin has come full cycle since the Whalen
case. Will the Wisconsin court and the Industrial Commission require
an unusual or abnormal strain even where the claimant is performing
some strenuous activity in his normal or routine duties, or will they
merely require such exertion where the claimant, as part of his cus-
tomary duties, is not exposed to what may be termed strenuous physical
exertion? To clarify the area for all concerned it would be commend-
able if the court would adopt an "unusual" strain doctrine, set out a
standard to measure what constitutes unusual strain, and adhere to this
doctrine in all heart cases where there is no evidence of a pre-existing
heart injury or defect. Without such guideposts cardiac litigation under
workmen's compensation will continue to drift haphazardly in a stormy
sea of confusion.
B. CARDIACS WITH PRE-EXISTING HEART DEFECT
Further complications arise when the claimant who suffers a fatal
or crippling cardiac had a pre-existing heart defect or injury. Since
medical science is not certain what percentage of the new injury arose
from the pre-existing condition and what portion from the claimant's
employment, it is incumbent upon the court to establish rules which may
be applied to resolve this dilemma.
In 1934, the Wisconsin court in Malleable Iron Range Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n,36 awarded compensation to an employee despite his pre-
35 Wisconsin Indus. Comm'n, Feb. 23, 1962.
36 215 Wis. 560, 255 N.W. 123 (1934).
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existing condition. The decedent was afflicted with arteriosclerosis in
an advanced stage and suffered a rupture while helping pull a jack up
an incline. A thrombosis developed, lodged in his lung, and thereby
caused the employee's death. In allowing recovery the court said:
The evidence leaves no room for doubt that the artery was ex-
tremely brittle and the rupture produced with less pressure or
exertion than would have been required to cause it in a person
of normal condition. This fact, however, does not prevent the
rupture from being the result of Grant's work.3 7
Thus it was established that if the requisite conditions of liability under
the workmen's compensation act were fulfilled, the fact of a pre-exist-
ing condition would not preclude recovery.
It must not be overlooked that even before recovery will be per-
mitted in a cardiac case where there is a pre-existing condition, there
must be proof of an accident. In Schmitt v. Industrial Comm'n,38 the
court denied recovery to an employee who was advanced in age and
suffering from numerous ailments which are normally attributed to old
age. Compensation was denied on the basis that there was no accident;
nor were any of the employee's ills attributed to an occupational dis-
ease. Rather, the court said that the claimant was merely suffering from
a general degenerative condition. Therefore, the court never considered
extending the doctrine set down in Malleable Iron Range.
It might be well to point out that no cardiac award has ever been
made by the court on grounds that such cardiac condition was an occu-
pational disease. For recovery based on an occupational disease, it must
be shown that the employment caused, aggravated, or accelerated the
disease.3 9 Due to the numerous factors involved and the nebulous na-
ture of heart injuries in general, the aforementioned proof could well
hinder any recovery based on this theory. The court has never candidly
ruled out the possibility of recovery in cardiac cases on the theory that
it is an occupational disease, but judging from statements made by the
court, such possibility appears remote if not hopeless. 40
Again in 1951, in the case of James C. Christensen,4' compensation
was awarded to an employee who was suffering from a pre-existing
37 Id. at 562, 255 N.W. at 124. The court went on to say that the showing of a
fortuitous event in conjunction with performing ones work plus the fact that
this had an open and immediate relation to the work which caused the in-jury, brought the case within the workmen's compensation act.38224 Wis. 531, 272 N.W. 486 (1937). Here the claimant was 72 years old, and
worked only eight months for the employer before he was forced to quit due
to trophic ulcers of both feet, diabetes, myocardial degeneration, and general
arteriosclerosis.39 Hayes v. Ajax Rubber Co., 202 Wis. 218, 231 N.W. 584 (1930).40 See Andrzeczak v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 12, 20 N.W. 2d 551 (1945);
Zabkowicz v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Wis. 317, 58 N.W. 2d 677 (1953); and
Cutler-Hammer Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d 247, 92 N.W. 2d 824(1958).
41 Wisconsin Indus. Comm'n, Nov. 11, 1951.
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heart condition. Medical testimony held that this fact, coupled with the
work effort and the existing weather conditions, was sufficient to cause
the applicant's eventual collapse and injury. However, there was no
medical testimony to the contrary and the Commission conceded that
opposing medical testimony could quite conceivably have altered their
ultimate decision. Although the Commission did not go so far as to say
that they were adopting one of the strain doctrines, they did point out
that the work effort was a significant factor in addition to the circum-
stances under which the work was performed. Not to be overlooked
in cases of pre-existing heart injury is the importance of medical testi-
mony, because frequently the factual matters may be in conflict and to
resolve those disputes in arriving at its final determination, the court
will be compelled to rely on expert medical testimony.
In Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,42 the court
impliedly put its stamp of approval on the Commission's greater reliance
upon medical testimony in heart cases where there was evidence of a
pre-existing condition, when it awarded recovery to an employee for
death resulting from the rupture of a congenital aneurysm in a cerebral
blood vessel. Medical testimony pointed out that the heavy lifting which
the employee was subjected to in the performance of his duties in-
creased his blood pressure, thereby causing the rupture. In allowing
recovery the court referred to the similarity this case had with the
Malleable Iron Range case.4 3
In none of the cases involving a pre-existing heart condition has
the court expressly mentioned either the "usual" or "unusual" strain
doctrines. However, in Wisconsin Appleton Co. v. Industrial Comnm'n,44
a case which involved a back injury and which on its facts was closely
related to cardiac cases with a pre-existing heart condition, the court
utilized language indicative of the "usual" strain doctrine. In that case
an employee who had a previous history of back problems bad been
performing heavy lifting in the scope of his normal employment func-
tions. The stresses and strains in his bending and his lifting of weights
in the usual routine manner brought about an "acute episode," requiring
an operation. In citing the Wisconsin Power & Light Co. case, the court
said that "it is not essential that the exertion producing the disability
be out of line with the ordinary duties of the job in order that the dis-
ability be compensable. '45 It must be conceded that this statement by
42 268 Wis. 513, 68 N.W. 2d 44 (1955).
43 The court, in referring to the Malleable Iron Range case, said: "That CasL,
medically and legally is so similar to the one now before us that we feel
obliged now to reach a similar conclusion. According to the most recent text
to which we have been referred, we are not alone in this view." 268 Wis.
at 517, 68 N.W. 2d at 47. See also 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 38.20, at
519.
44269 Wis. 312,69 N.W. 2d 433 (1955).
45 Id. at 322, 69 N.W. 2d at 439.
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the court is all-inclusive, and certainly for a determination of that
particular case such a broad and all encompassing statement was not
necessary. However, the court has never retracted nor qualified the scope
of this statement in subsequent cases. In cardiac cases previous to the
Wisconsin Appleton Co. case, the court failed to mention either of the
strain doctrines and yet recovery was permitted in these cases despite
the fact that the attack occurred while the employee was performing
his routine duties. This adds further strength to the contention that the
court did intend their statement to apply to cardiac cases where there
was a pre-existing heart condition. If such is the situation, it appears
that the court will grant compensation in these cardiac cases so long
as the medical testimony clearly substantiates the probability of the
causal relationship, irrespective of whether such duties were merely the
routine functions of the employee, provided that all other elements for
recovery under the workmen's compensation act are present. However,
the reliability of such argument will be doubtful until this precise
question is brought before the court for judgment.
In its latest case, Johnston v. Industrial Comm" n,40 the court refused
recovery to an employee of a municipality who, after slipping while
attempting to replace a manhole cover, fell and became lodged in the
manhole and later suffered a cerebral thrombosis. Here too, the ap-
plicant had a pre-existing heart condition but the medical testimony
differed as to what actually led to the attack in question. After one of
the medical experts made conflicting statements as to the cause of the
injury to the heart and stated that any statement made by him as to
what prompted the injury would be mere speculation, the court held
that in consequence of claimant's inability to meet his burden of proof
recovery could not be granted.
Summary
In attempting to reach a conclusion based upon those cardiac cases
where the claimant was subject to a pre-existing heart condition, there
are few proven principles on which to rely. The court in this area has
consistently adhered to medical testimony where possible, especially if
such testimony is able to establish to a reasonable probability that the
heart injury did relate to the employment, even though both the em-
ployer and employee knew of the pre-existing deficiency. It also appears
that the court is more receptive to the application of the "usual" strain
doctrine in this area, and in most instances once the causal relationship
is established, the court has put little or no emphasis upon the degree
of strain involved. Where there is a pre-existing condition, as compared
to a cardiac case without such pre-existing deficiency, there is less like-
lihood that the determination will be grounded exclusively on the factual
situation.
4 3 Wis. 2d 173, 87 N.W. 2d 822 (1958).
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Despite these few generalizations, no definite standard has been
established or consistently applied in this area. No doubt there is greater
opportunity for an employee with a pre-existing heart condition to take
advantage of the workmen's compensation provisions through spurious
claims than for one who is not the possessor of such a pre-existing trait.
This factor alone should prompt the establishment of a criterion or
norm by which such claims may be litigated. The development of any
formula will depend upon a process of trial and error, and the time is
now ripe for the inception of such a development.
JAMES F. BARTL
